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LEARNING FROM CURRENT MISTAKES:
DEVELOPING SLOVENIA’S ELECTRIC 
GENERATION INFRASTRUCTURE
Alexander Niewiarowski
Introduction
 Slovenia has one of the smallest electric 
grids in the European Union, but the issues 
that the country’s electricity sector faces are 
not trivial. The EU has imposed demanding 
policy pressures to produce clean and lean 
power while curbing demand. However, Slove-
nia’s electricity generation sector has powerful, 
state-owned companies pursuing big genera-
tion projects that could become environmental 
and financial liabilities. In particular, an ongo-
ing project to build a 600-megawatt (MW) coal 
power plant has run into financial problems 
and has sparked environmental concerns, rais-
ing questions about the direction in which the 
country’s power sector is headed. 
 This article presents the broad back-
ground of Slovenia’s electricity system before 
critically examining proposals for its future de-
velopment. Specifically, it argues that Slovenia 
should make promoting small-scale renewable 
energy projects a long-term priority in order 
to avoid financial risks associated with larger 
projects, to help increase competition and pri-
vate sector involvement in a heavily concen-
trated public market, and to meet present and 
future environmental goals mandated by the 
EU. 
Background
 Structure of the Slovenian  
 Electricity Sector
 Upon gaining independence in 1991, the 
Republic of Slovenia divided its state-owned 
electricity assets into generation companies, 
a transmission system operator, and a dis-
tribution system operator. Prior to acceding 
into the EU in 2004, Slovenia formalized this 
three-tiered structure of the electricity sector 
by adopting an Energy Act (1999). The Ener-
gy Act established a regulatory Energy Agency 
and paved the way to liberalizing the market. 
In compliance with EU Directives 2003/54/EC 
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and 2009/72/EC, the Slovenian electricity sec-
tor has been fully unbundled and open since 
2007, meaning that generation companies cut 
financial ties with the transmission system 
operator (to ensure competitive access to the 
transmission grid), and households became 
free to select their suppliers.  
 Most major generation facilities (those 
with capacities greater than 10 MW) currently 
belong to the holding companies Holding Slov-
enske Elektrarne (HSE) and GEN Energija.1 In 
2001 the government of Slovenia merged most 
of the state-owned generation companies to 
form HSE. Then in 2006 the government took 
steps to privatize its generation assets and in-
crease competition by restructuring HSE and 
creating GEN Energija. GEN Energija gained 
control of Slovenia’s only nuclear power plant, 
Nuklearna Elektrarna Krško (NEK), which 
is co-owned with Croatia. Because of bilater-
al agreements between Slovenia and Croatia, 
NEK cannot be privatized. However, HSE has 
not yet attracted any tenders, and both compa-
nies remain 100 percent state-owned, effective-
ly acting as a duopoly. The current ownership 
structure is shown in Figure 1.
 As seen in Figure 1, HSE and GEN En-
ergija control a large portion of the generation 
market, both in terms of installed capacity and 
production. As specified in the Slovenian Pre-
vention of Restriction of Competition Act, a 
company has a dominant market position if its 
market share exceeds 40 percent or if it shares 
more than 60 percent of the market with one 
or more companies. HSE alone controls 64 
percent of the production in Slovenia, while 
HSE and GEN Energija together control 87.8 
percent of the production in Slovenia (“Report 
on the Energy Sector…,” p. 39). The trans-
. 
mission system operator, Elektro Slovenija 
(ELES), and the distribution system operator, 
Sistemski Operator Distribucijskega Omrež-
ja (Electricity Distribution System Operator) 
(SODO), are also 100 percent state-owned.2 In 
all, the government of Slovenia owns about 80 
percent of the electricity sector, which is one of 
the highest state ownership rates in the EU-27 
(European Bank...).
 Slovenia in the Regional Market and  
 the European Union
 Slovenia plays an important role in the 
regional and European electricity market, pri-
marily due to its strategic location. ELES has 
cross-border transmission capabilities with 
three of four of Slovenia’s neighbors: Croatia, 
Austria, and Italy.3 Slovenia’s importance in the 
European market became even more apparent 
in 2011, when the city of Ljubljana won the 
seat for the new Agency for the Cooperation 
of Energy Regulators (ACER). ACER’s main 
responsibilities include coordinating national 
energy authorities with the purpose of creating 
pan-European network rules, performing con-
sulting tasks for various EU institutions, and 
monitoring general trends in the markets. 
 Since acceding into the EU, Slovenia 
has faced new levels of policy pressures and 
responsibilities. Slovenian energy policy must 
conform to a wide body of EU legislation, com-
monly referred to as the EU Energy Communi-
ty acquis communautaire. Two major pieces of 
relevant legislation include the Third Energy 
Liberalization Package and the EU Climate and 
Energy Package. The Third Energy Liberaliza-
tion Package issued directives and regulations 
to help create a single European energy market 
by 2014; the EU Climate and Energy Package is 
discussed in detail below.  1HSE owns almost all major generation facilities, 
notably the Termoelektrarna Šoštanj and several hydro-
power plants on the Drava and Socˇa rivers through the 
companies Dravske Elektrarne Maribor and Soške Elek-
trarne Nova Gorica. Apart from NEK, GEN Energija owns a 
few hydropower plants on the Sava River through the com-
pany Savske Elektrarne Ljubljana and a smaller thermal 
power plant, Termoelektrarna Brestanica. Another hydro-
electric company that operates on the lower Sava River, Hi-
droelektrarne Na Spodnji Savi, is co-owned by HSE, GEN 
Energija, and their subsidiaries. Other major generation 
facilities, namely Termoelektrarna Toplarna Ljubljana and 
the Termoelektrarna Trbovlje, belong to other government 
entities or private owners, respectively.
 2ELES, founded in 1990, is responsible for the man-
agement, strategic planning, construction, and mainte-
nance of the transmission network, as defined in the En-
ergy Act. ELES sells electricity on the wholesale market 
to five regional distributors that operate under concession 
contracts from SODO as well as supplying a few large in-
dustrial customers directly. ELES is also responsible for 
matters pertaining to cross-border transmission.
 3A long-expected 440-kV link to Hungary was finally 
approved in late 2012 and is scheduled for completion in 
2014 (Elektro-Slovenija).
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 The EU Climate and Energy Package
 The legislation in the broad EU “20-20-
20” Climate and Energy Package aims to re-
duce greenhouse gas emissions by 20 percent 
(from 1990 levels), bring the use of renewable 
energy sources (RESs) to 20 percent of total 
energy consumption, and increase overall en-
ergy efficiency by 20 percent, all by the year 
2020. The EU aims to achieve these EU-wide 
targets by reforming its Emissions Trading 
System (which includes the power sector) and 
by setting targets for each member country re-
garding emissions not controlled by the Emis-
sions Trading System, RES usage, and energy 
efficiency.4 
 By 2020 Slovenia is expected to increase 
RES usage from 16.2 percent (2005) to 25 percent 
and to increase energy efficiency by 20 percent, 
per Directives 2009/28/EC and 2012/27/EU, 
respectively. The 25 percent target for RESs 
refers to an average increase in the following 
three sectors: heating and cooling, electricity 
generation, and an obligatory 10 percent in-
crease in transport. To meet the overall goal, 
Slovenia has adopted a mandatory National 
Renewable Energy Action Plan (NREAP) for 
2010–2020 (“National Renewable...”), conse-
quently agreeing to increase its use of RESs in 
electricity generation to 39.3 percent by 2020. 
The NREAP assesses and determines the nec-
essary yearly quantities for RES consumption 
in each sector as well as proposing measures 
 4These individualized targets are based on wealth, 
starting points, and technical capacity. The emissions and 
RES targets are binding whereas the energy efficiency tar-
get is nonbinding.
Figure 1 
Installed Capacity, Production, and Ownership Structure of Major Slovenian  
Power Generation Companies
Sources: “Report on the Energy Sector in Slovenia for 2012” and company data.
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to facilitate consumption of the desired quan-
tity of energy from RESs in future years. The 
target gross electrical consumption in 2020 is 
projected to be 15.6 terawatt hours (TWh), of 
which 6.129 TWh will come from RESs (“Na-
tional Renewable...”).
 In recent years, Slovenia has steadily 
increased its share of RESs in electricity gen-
eration, generally in line with its NREAP pro-
jections. RES usage in electricity generation 
peaked at 33.8 percent in 2009, mostly due to 
favorable hydrologic conditions, before drop-
ping to 32.2 percent in 2010 (Beurskens, p. 159). 
The target for 2012 was 4.224 TWh, or 32.3 
percent of total consumption, a figure around 
which the sector has been hovering in recent 
years. 
 Favorable government support schemes 
are the primary driver of increasing renew-
able energy use. Slovenia has been promoting 
RESs with feed-in tariffs, premium tariffs, sub-
sidies, and loans. Feed-in tariffs offer plants 
with capacities up to 5 MW the opportunity 
to sell their electricity at a guaranteed price. 
The premium tariff scheme allows producers 
with larger capacities to sell their electricity 
on the open market while receiving financial 
support based on reference costs of electricity. 
Occasionally, the Ministry of Spatial Planning 
invites tenders for subsidies of RES projects, 
while the Environmental Fund offers low-in-
terest loans to RES projects, subject to funding 
availability (Brunec, pp. 1–2). The NREAP esti-
mates that the cost of these support measures 
through 2020 will be €456.06 million (“Nation-
al Renewable...”).
Figure 2 
Electricity Consumption in 2012 by Generation Type
Source: Energy Agency data.
Note: Energy Agency data consider generation and transmission losses and differ from company data, 
which represent gross generation
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 It is important to note the energy poli-
cies currently being drafted by the EU for 2030 
and beyond. At the time of this writing, the 
legislation agreed to aim to set binding targets 
for all member countries to reduce EU-wide 
greenhouse gas emissions by 40 percent from 
1990 levels and nonbinding targets to bring 
RES use up to an EU-wide average of 27 per-
cent. Furthermore, the EU climate roadmap 
sets an ambitious goal of reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions by 80 percent by 2050, with most 
cuts coming from the power generation sector, 
which is expected to be virtually carbon-free 
(93−99 percent reduction from 1990 levels) by 
mid-century (“A Sectoral Perspective”).
Recent Performance of the Electric 
Generation Sector
 In 2012 Slovenia produced 12.25 TWh 
(company data, excluding losses5) of electric-
ity (taking into account the 50 percent share 
of the nuclear plant NEK), using a relatively 
balanced share of conventional thermal, nucle-
ar, and hydroelectric energy, as illustrated in 
Figure 2. The rest of the electricity generated, 
approximately 1 TWh, came from distributed 
generation (DG) facilities. DG facilities are de-
fined as having a capacity of less than 10 MW. 
The total consumption, excluding losses in the 
system, amounted to 12.631 TWh. Slovenia 
thus remained a net importer of electricity, 
with domestic production meeting approxi-
mately 88 percent of demand (“Report on the 
Energy Sector…,” p. 15).
 Thermal Power  
 The largest share of electricity produced 
in Slovenia comes from thermal power plants, 
which in 2012 featured a combined capacity of 
approximately 1258 MW and generated 4.764 
TWh using gas and domestic coal (“Report on 
the Energy Sector…,” p. 39). Of the four major 
thermal power plants (Figure 2), Termoelek-
trarna Šoštanj (TEŠ), a subsidiary of HSE, is by 
far the largest. With a total installed capacity 
of 779 MW and annual electricity production 
ranging from 3.5 to 3.8 TWh, TEŠ alone ac-
counts for about a third of Slovenia’s total do-
mestic production. The three coal-fired units 
currently in operation at TEŠ run on lignite 
from the nearby Premogovnik Velenje mine, 
also owned by HSE.
 These three units are generally consid-
ered technologically obsolete, financially un-
sustainable, and environmentally unacceptable 
and will be shut down by 2027.  In order to 
guarantee electricity and heat production well 
into the twenty-first century, HSE is current-
ly constructing a single 600-MW lignite-fired 
plant, Unit 6, to replace the existing three 
units. In terms of cost and capacity, Unit 6 is 
the biggest energy project currently underway 
in Slovenia and has been the source of numer-
ous controversies (discussed later). 
 Hydropower
 In 2012, hydroelectric power plants 
(HPPs) produced 3.815 TWh,6 almost a third 
of the electricity consumed in Slovenia. With 
a total installed capacity of 1270 MW, hydro-
electric power represents roughly 40 percent 
of Slovenia’s generation capacity (“Report on 
the Energy Sector…,” p. 38). Like most RESs, 
hydropower output can be unpredictable, be-
cause it depends on hydrologic conditions. 
Hydropower in Slovenia produces significant-
ly less electricity than thermal power plants, 
even though the installed capacities are sim-
ilar. However, because hydropower represents 
Slovenia’s largest renewable energy resource, 
there are many incentives to further develop 
its potential to help Slovenia fulfill EU commit-
ments. Accordingly, approximately 750 MW of 
additional capacity are expected by 2022 (“Re-
port on the Energy Sector…,” p. 66).
 The major HPP installations in Slovenia 
are owned and operated by subsidiaries of HSE 
and Gen Energija. The largest hydroelectric 
company, Dravske Elektrarne Maribor (DEM), 
operates on the Drava River, with a total ca-
pacity of 588.6 MW, producing approximately 
80 percent of Slovenia’s renewable electricity. 
Soške Elektrarne Nova Gorica (SENG) oper-
ates on the Socˇa River and its tributaries with 
a total capacity of 161 MW. SENG also operates 
 5Losses in 2012 were estimated to be approximately 
0.875 TWh, or 6.7 percent of transmitted electricity.
 6This figure excludes small producers with capaci-
ties <10 MW.
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the pumped storage plant Avcˇe (“Hidroelek-
trarne”). 
 Another major hydropower company, 
Hidroelektrarne Na Spodnji Savi (HE-SS), is 
a joint venture between HSE, Gen Energija, 
DEM, SEL, SENG, and TEB. HSE is the ma-
jority owner, with 51 percent of the shares. 
HE-SS is developing the hydropower potential 
of the lower Sava River with a series of five new 
HPPs, three of which are already complete. 
The two remaining plants are scheduled to 
come online by 2018. The final nominal capac-
ity of the five HPPs will be 186.5 MW, which 
HSE estimates will produce an average of 0.72 
TWh annually and cover 6 percent of Slove-
nia’s demand (“Construction of HPPs…”). 
However, an even bigger hydropower project is 
under consideration for the middle course of 
the Sava River. HSE plans to construct a chain 
of ten new HPPs with a total capacity of 295.4 
MW (0.994 TWh annually) (“Annual Report…,” 
p. 66). Although funding has been secured, the 
construction timeline has been pushed back 
at least five years, with the completion of the 
project unlikely before 2030  (“Construction of 
HPPs…”). Nevertheless, Slovenia’s hydroelec-
tric potential will continue to be developed for 
the foreseeable future. 
 Nuclear Power
 The only nuclear power plant in Slove-
nia, the 696-MW Nuclearna Elektrarna Krško 
(NEK), began commercial operations in 1983. 
Built in former Yugoslavia, today NEK remains 
co-owned by Slovenia’s GEN Energija and Cro-
atia’s Hrvatska Elektroprivreda, with output 
divided 50/50 between the two countries. Ac-
counting for the share of production belonging 
to Croatia, NEK supplied about 19 percent of 
the electricity consumed in Slovenia in 2012 
(“Report on the Energy Sector…,” p. 39). NEK 
was built with a planned lifetime of 40 years, 
meaning it is scheduled for decommissioning 
in 2023. However, due to continuous upgrades 
in instrumentation, controls, and equipment, 
GEN Energija is confident that the lifetime of 
the plant can be extended to 2043.
 There have also been proposals for the 
construction of a new nuclear power plant at 
Krško (NEK 2) by 2030. The nominal capacity 
of such a facility would be at least 1,000 MW. 
Currently, all feasibility and acceptability stud-
ies for this new power plant have been com-
pleted as well as several other documents nec-
essary for decision-making purposes, including 
pre-investment studies, conceptual design and 
requirements, initial environmental assess-
ments, and preliminary safety studies (“Update 
on Slovenia Nuclear…”).
 Small Producers Connected to the  
 Distribution Network
 In 2012 small producers generated ap-
proximately 1.049 TWh. The majority of this 
Source: “TEŠ Today.”
Table 1
Installed and Planned Capacity at TEŠ
Unit
Gross Power Output
(MW) Years of Operation
Unit 1 30 1956−2010?
Unit 2 30 1956−2008?
Unit 3 75 1960−2015?
Unit 4 275 1972−2015?
Unit 5 345 1977−2027?
Gas units 2 × 42 2008−2027?
Unit 6 600 2016−2054?
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came from DG, which produced 0.956 TWh 
with 471.19 MW of installed capacity. DG proj-
ects, unlike the large central generation plants 
(discussed previously), are small electric-gen-
eration installations connected to the distribu-
tion network,7 which produce electricity that 
is used on-site or nearby. Most DG facilities 
use RESs, such as hydroelectric power, solar, 
or biogas/biomass, although some (approxi-
mately 40 MW) in Slovenia are cogeneration 
plants that use fossil fuels. Due to the favorable 
RES support schemes (discussed previously), 
installed solar capacity approximately doubled 
from 2011 to 2012 to 240.4 MW and produced 
0.121 TWh, making up the largest share of DG 
by capacity (“Report on the Energy Sector…,” 
pp. 38−39). 
A Critical Examination of Generation 
System Development
 The National Energy Program  
 for 2010–2030
 In 2011 Slovenia released a draft of its Na-
tional Energy Program (NEP) for 2010−2030 
(“Proposal of the...”) for public review and con-
sultation. This important planning document, 
prepared for the Ministry of the Economy by 
the Jožef Stefan Institute, will guide Slovenia’s 
long-term developmental objectives and poli-
cies regarding the supply and use of energy in 
the electricity, natural gas, transportation, and 
heating sectors through the year 2030. Keep-
ing in mind the close relationship between na-
tional and EU energy policy, the NEP focuses 
on environmental sustainability, security of 
supply, and competitiveness in the process of 
developing infrastructure of national impor-
tance. Slovenia’s apparent long-term strategic 
goal, as made evident in the NEP, is to become a 
regional net exporter of electricity. This would 
require increases in generation capacity and 
market efficiency. Currently, Slovenia and all 
of its neighbors are net importers of electricity 
(“Annual Report…,” p. 55).
 In terms of electricity production, the 
NEP analyzes several combinations of gener-
ation capacity, paying attention to security of 
supply, competitiveness, and how well each 
combination would allow Slovenia to meet a 
host of EU requirements for 2020 and 2030. As-
suming the completion of TEŠ Unit 6, the still 
pertinent scenarios are the base scenario, the 
nuclear scenario, and the natural gas scenario. 
The base scenario foresees the continuation of 
all current projects and measures, including 
more hydropower on the Sava River, the com-
pletion of TEŠ Unit 6, a life extension of NEK 
to 2043 (from 2023), and the construction of 
new cogeneration and gas turbine plants. The 
nuclear scenario builds on the basic scenario 
and foresees the construction of a new nuclear 
power plant at Krško before 2030, with a nom-
inal capacity of at least 1,000 MW. The natural 
gas scenario is another variation of the basic 
scenario and would entail the construction of 
two combined gas turbine-steam cycle plants 
with a total capacity of approximately 800 MW 
by 2030.
 With respect to the electricity sector as 
a whole, the NEP also analyses two strategies 
regarding questions of sustainability. Integrat-
ing the conclusions of the NREAP, the NEP 
addresses issues of RES development, energy 
efficiency at production and consumption lev-
els, local energy supply, and the cogeneration 
of heat and electricity. The reference strategy 
ensures minimal compliancy with internation-
al obligations, whereas the intensive strategy 
creates a support environment to promote 
profitable green energy projects. In effect, the 
intensive strategy sets more ambitious targets 
for energy efficiency, the share of RESs, and 
the production of energy at a local level. 
 Every analyzed scenario and strategy 
fulfills all adopted international legal require-
ments and obligations and meets industry 
standards in terms of competitiveness and se-
curity of supply. With respect to the climate 
and the environment, the pertinent legisla-
tion includes the Kyoto Protocol and the EU 
Climate and Energy Package. The NEP also 
considers possible EU climate goals for 2050, 
which include a nearly complete cessation of 
CO2 emissions in the electricity generation 
sector.
 In terms of sustainability, the NEP pro-
poses the intensive strategy. Even though the 
two strategies do not differ significantly in 
2020, the intensive strategy provides significant 
 7Small producers connected to the transmission 
grid produced 0.093 TWh, using a capacity of 25.6 MW.
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benefits by 2030. Namely, the intensive strate-
gy would result in a 53 percent share of RESs 
in electricity production versus 44 percent in 
the reference strategy. For large-scale electric-
ity generation, the NEP recommends the basic 
and nuclear scenarios on the basis of lower sup-
ply costs and smaller emissions. The natural 
gas scenario provides no direct advantages over 
the other two scenarios except a lower initial 
investment cost, but it would result in a high-
er dependence on imports and result in great-
er emissions of carbon dioxide and mono-ni-
trogen oxides. The basic scenario adequately 
covers Slovenia’s consumption needs through 
2030, whereas the nuclear scenario designates 
a large share of electricity for export.
 Two Ways Forward
 In the most general terms, the proposals 
for the development of the Slovenian genera-
tion system detailed in the NEP fall into two 
categories: single, large, central-generation 
projects like TEŠ Unit 6 or the proposed NEK 
2, and the numerous smaller investments such 
as those backed by the government RES sup-
port schemes. These categories constitute a 
choice that the country must make regarding 
the future of its electricity generation system. 
Slovenia can invest public money to back large 
projects or support the development of smaller 
projects and DG. Although it is important to 
have a diverse generation system, large proj-
ects have the potential to become financial and 
environmental burdens and, compared with 
smaller alternatives, are not as well suited to 
Slovenia’s size and national demand. In fact, 
the NEP has provoked critical comments from 
a wide spectrum of the public, including envi-
ronmental groups such as Greenpeace and for-
eign agencies such as the Environment Agency 
of Austria, for its support for TEŠ Unit 6 and 
NEK 2. 
 Unit 6 has been the source of continu-
ous public controversy since it was proposed 
in 2006, even though HSE and TEŠ present-
ed Unit 6 as an environmentally friendly and 
financially prudent investment. According to 
TEŠ, the new unit will provide Slovenia with 
a safe and secure supply of electricity by gen-
erating the same amount of power as the ex-
isting units but at higher efficiencies and with 
lower emissions. The company promises to 
eventually cut emissions of sulfur dioxide from 
400 to 100 mg/Nm3 and emissions of mono-ni-
trogen oxides from 500 to 150 mg/Nm3 while 
reducing specific emissions of carbon dioxide 
(emissions per unit of power produced) by 35 
percent (“Unit 6 of Sostanj…,” p. 2). Howev-
er, environmental groups have been quick to 
criticize this large coal project that will cover 
roughly a third of Slovenia’s demand for elec-
tricity yet use up virtually all of the country’s 
carbon allowances by 2050. As stated in its in-
vestment plans, TEŠ expects to operate Unit 6 
until 2054, coinciding with the year that the 
lignite reserves at the Premogovnik Velenje 
mine will be depleted. From an environmental 
standpoint, lignite is one of the dirtiest fuels, 
and running the plant through the middle of 
the century could hinder Slovenia’s ability to 
meet any potential new EU climate targets. 
As mentioned previously, the EU climate road 
map foresees a 93 to 99 percent reduction of 
CO2 emissions from 1990 levels in the power 
generation sector by 2050 (“A Sectoral Per-
spective”). Provided that Slovenia was emit-
ting approximately 18.5 MMTCDE in 1990,8 
the country will have to emit no more than a 
collective 3.9 MMTCDE in 2050 (“Greenhouse 
Gas Emission Trends…”). By comparison, 
TEŠ today emits almost 5 MMTCDE (Kovacˇicˇ, 
p. 322), so even the 35 percent reduction in spe-
cific CO2 emissions would result in about 3.25 
MMTCDE emissions from TEŠ alone. Further 
environmental complaints about Unit 6 regard 
the lack of alternatives proposed in the invest-
ment plan and the lack of detail concerning the 
implementation and viability of future carbon 
capture and storage technologies (“Complaint: 
Sostanj…,” pp. 9–12). Barring a shutdown of 
the plant before 2054, implementing carbon 
capture and storage technology, which remains 
expensive and experimental, would be the only 
way Slovenia could feasibly meet the proposed 
EU climate obligations. 
 Cost and Benefits: RES Support   
 Scheme versus TEŠ Unit 6
 8Million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent 
(MMTCDE) refers to a theoretical amount of CO2 needed to 
absorb the same amount of heat as the total amount of all 
greenhouse gas emissions in question.
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 In contrast to large-scale projects like 
Unit 6, small-scale capacity increases, which 
often use renewable energy and are backed by 
private initiatives, rarely provoke controver-
sy. In order to obtain a rough estimate of the 
relative financial performance of each of the 
two approaches to developing the generation 
system, the projected cost of the RES support 
measures presented in the NREAP can be used 
as a reference. Comparing the RES support 
scheme in the NREAP and Unit 6 in terms of 
their respective costs and benefits suggests 
that promoting small-scale renewable energy 
projects makes economic sense. Executing the 
NREAP will result in an additional 557 MW of 
renewable generation capacity by 2020, com-
parable to the 600 MW capacity of Unit 6 (“Na-
tional Renewable...”). However, due to varying 
maintenance requirements, distributed RES 
facilities can operate for a greater number of 
collective operating hours than a single plant 
like Unit 6. This means that the completed 
RES installations will produce an estimated 
6.126 TWh annually whereas Unit 6 will pro-
duce only 3.5 TWh (6650 h/year) (“Annual 
Report…,” p. 64). The two approaches to de-
veloping the generation system diverge further 
when examined in financial terms. The €456.06 
million in paid RES support predicted by the 
NREAP is significantly less than the estimated 
€1.44 billion cost of Unit 6. Unit 6 is backed by 
state-backed loans from the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and the Eu-
ropean Investment Bank together worth €650 
million, with an additional €100 million syndi-
cated to commercial banks (Guay et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, the NREAP foresees several posi-
tive effects on the Slovenian economy resulting 
from the RES support schemes, which include 
a potential €1.3 billion in private spending and 
investments, up to 339 permanent jobs, and 
10,603 person-years of employment during de-
velopment (“National Renewable...”).
 These figures contrast sharply with Unit 
6’s predicted financial performance, which has 
always been questioned. Only now as construc-
tion nears completion are the consequences 
becoming clear. The current cost is almost dou-
ble that in the original budget, and the invest-
ment plan has been amended five times, with 
constantly changing projections regarding the 
internal rate of return, the price of coal, and 
the cost of carbon credits. Although the project 
will create 200 permanent jobs, Unit 6 is now 
predicted to operate at an annual loss of €50 
million if completed by 2015 due to the afore-
mentioned miscalculations (Guay et al., 2014). 
After numerous debates and uncertainties, Slo-
venia will complete the project, because not 
doing so would result in even greater losses. 
Overshadowing the financial controversy have 
been allegations of corruption in awarding con-
struction contracts. At the time of this writing, 
HSE is facing cash-flow problems and is behind 
on payments to contractors. 
 The TEŠ Unit 6 project, with its envi-
ronmental and financial troubles, is a product 
of the high rate of government ownership of 
a highly concentrated generation sector and 
does not set a good example for the future of 
Slovenia’s generation system. Instead, Slove-
nia should support smaller RES projects and 
back away from additional larger state-funded 
projects such as NEK 2. Generally, gradual, 
smaller-scale RES investments pose a lesser 
financial risk, can increase competition and 
private-sector involvement in a heavily con-
centrated public market, and promote green 
job creation, while enabling Slovenia to meet 
EU climate targets. In particular, increasing 
RES usage will help offset the environmental 
and financial effects of TEŠ Unit 6.  
 Large projects yield more generation ca-
pacity compared with small RES investments, 
but they come with disproportionately larger 
financial risks. Given the serious financial sit-
uation of Unit 6 (discussed previously), a new 
nuclear facility would be even more costly 
and financially insecure as well as completely 
unnecessary to meet future domestic energy 
demands. NEP projections show that Slove-
nia can export electricity with no additional 
nuclear facilities. Constructing NEK 2 would 
result in significant overcapacity, especially if 
NEK receives a lifetime extension past 2030 
(Lechtenböhmer et al., p. 11). If built, NEK 2 
would result in a net export of up to 10.2 TWh 
(“Proposal of the...,” p. 152). Given the large 
start-up and operational costs associated with 
nuclear power plants, Slovenia would have to 
rely on decades of high output and stable base 
load electricity prices in the regional market in 
order to make NEK 2 profitable. These market 
conditions are far from guaranteed. Austria is 
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seeking to limit imports of nuclear energy, and 
Slovenia’s neighbors will be increasing their 
own share of RESs in the coming years. An 
increased share of DG RESs in the region will 
cause the price of base-load electricity to fall, 
because RESs provide more flexible and more 
easily dispatched electricity (Lechtenböhmer 
et al., p. 12). These factors pose significant fi-
nancial risks that could reverberate through 
the Slovenian economy. 
 Furthermore, big-budget projects like 
Unit 6 are a product of the current two-pillar 
market structure, characterized by large, state-
owned utilities, which operate in an increas-
ingly concentrated market with little room for 
private competition. Given the lack of success 
in privatizing HSE, a good way for Slovenia to 
increase private sector involvement and com-
petition is to promote small RES projects such 
as DG, which are well suited to private invest-
ment. Supporting DG projects is in Slovenia’s 
favor. DG increases the use of RESs while im-
proving the efficiency of the entire system by 
reducing transmission and distribution losses. 
DG projects also improve the security of elec-
tricity supply while deferring expensive trans-
mission system upgrades (where DG is more 
cost effective). 
 Financial questions aside, such large 
projects, which have decades-long operational 
lives, may not be appropriate for meeting de-
mand and may also crowd out investments in 
RESs and associated balancing infrastructure 
due to Slovenia’s small size. Supporting and 
investing in RESs conveys several economic 
benefits, such as those discussed by the NREAP. 
However, increasing the share of RESs and DG 
presents a challenge to the distribution system 
operator because it creates a fluctuating and 
distributed electricity supply, with voltage of-
ten dependent on environmental conditions. 
Balancing such a supply of electricity requires 
an infrastructure different from that used in 
the traditional top-down approach to electricity 
production. To effectively address these issues, 
the distribution system operator must invest 
in networked metering technologies, known as 
smart grids, as well as virtual power plant tech-
nologies that allow electricity from DG instal-
lations to be fed into the grid smoothly. These 
technologies have the opportunity to be a sig-
nificant economic driver but unfortunately do 
not feature prominently in the NEP. However, 
Slovenia is investing in smart meters, which 
allow near–real time communication between 
the meter and the distribution system opera-
tor to enable dynamic pricing to help match 
supply and demand. The NEP expects that the 
distribution system operator will provide 100 
percent of electricity customers with smart 
meters by 2016 (“Proposal of the...,” p. 95).
 Slovenia can invest more in RESs than 
are specified in the NEP and in the smart grid 
infrastructure required to manage these sourc-
es. Photovoltaic installations are predicted to 
gain popularity in Slovenia as associated costs 
continue to decline in Europe. The 240 MW of 
installed solar capacity in 2012 already exceeds 
the 2020 NREAP target of 139 MW and is well 
on the way to meeting the NEP target of 337 
MW (“Global Market Outlook…,” p. 28). Fur-
thermore, while the NEP predicts hydropower 
to generate 5 TWh in 2020, an increase from 
3.8 TWh in 2012, HSE estimates that more 
than half of Slovenia’s hydroelectric potential 
remains unexploited (Kovacˇ). 
Conclusion
 Even though the policy pressures after 
2020 remain uncertain and the long-term cli-
mate goals may or may not be met, increasing 
RES usage should remain a long-term priority 
for Slovenia. Slovenia can lead the EU by ex-
ample by aggressively developing its renewable 
energy resources to create an environmentally 
conscious and financially viable electricity sec-
tor. Slovenia’s electricity system is one of the 
smallest in Europe, meaning that even modest 
investments in RESs contribute significantly 
to overall generation capacity. After 2020, the 
country can develop more RESs than is cur-
rently specified in the NEP. This will require 
additional investment in active-grid technol-
ogies as well as political willpower if the EU 
backs away from binding RES requirements for 
2030. Larger RES projects, such as the planned 
hydroelectric installations on the Sava River, 
can be combined with smaller DG projects to 
develop a diversified generation system. In-
creasing the share of RESs in electricity gen-
eration will also decrease the need for future 
problematic investments like Unit 6 or NEK 
2, while promoting smaller DG projects will 
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help increase competition and innovation in a 
highly concentrated market. Even though TEŠ 
Unit 6 was a product of this market structure, 
it should be the last of its kind in the future of 
Slovenia’s electricity generation sector.
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